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Abstract 
The proposal has been put forward that ecological economics seek to become substantive 
economics (Gerber and Scheidel 2018).  This raises important issues about the content and 
direction of ecological economics.  The division of economics into either substantive or 
formal derives from the work of Karl Polanyi.  In developing his ideas Polanyi employed a 
definition from Menger and combined this with Tönnies theory of historical evolution.  In this 
paper I explore why the resulting substantive vs. formal dichotomy is problematic.  In 
particular the article exposes the way in which trying to impose this dichotomy on history of 
economic thought and epistemology leads to further false dichotomies.  Besides Polanyi, the 
positions of other important thinkers informing social ecological economics (SEE) are 
discussed including Neurath, Kapp and Georgescu-Roegen.  The aim is to clarify the future 
direction of ecological economics and the role, in that future, of ideas raised under the topic of 
substantive economics. 
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1. Introduction 
In their article “In Search of Substantive Economics” Gerber and Scheidel (2018) have made 
an important contribution to the debate over how ecological economics should construct a 
coherent and integrated theoretical understanding.1  Their clear concern for a divorce from 
neoclassical economics and ‘free’ market apologists is evident.  Support for their position 
comes from social ecological economics (SEE) and its logic of defining ecological economics 
as a heterodox field of research (Spash, 2012a, 2013).  Consistent with this, the authors bring 
together a range of relevant thinkers (e.g., Kapp, Polanyi, Neurath, Marx) who provide 
important insights into the problems with capitalism and the potential for transformative 
alternatives.  In this respect they helpfully open the door to a wider discussion as to the 
content and direction of ecological economics. 
 
Along these lines a bold proposal by Gerber and Scheidel (2018) is that three research 
agendas be pursued, namely social metabolism, political institutional structure and needs.  
While perhaps the authors feel their proposal is self-evident it is rather lacking in theoretical 
support.  The claim to having established “the three pillars of substantive economics” is also 
open to debate (e.g. why three?; on what theoretical basis do they rest?; as pillars are they 
unrelated?; what exactly do they support?).  However, I do not wish to take issue with the 
three agendas.  Neither is my concern with the central part of their paper that addresses one of 
these agendas, social metabolism.  What I would like to explore is the headline claim that we, 
ecological economists, should be seeking a substantive economics.  I will take issue with the 
basis on which they argue for defining ecological economics in terms of substantive 
economics, and with their doing so by appealing to a set of strongly drawn dichotomies.  The 
principle amongst those dichotomies being the definition of economics as either ‘substantive’ 
or ‘formal’. 
                                                 
1 Relevant text form Gerber and Scheidel (2018) is included as Appendix I. 
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The distinction between these ‘two meanings of economics’ (to borrow from Polanyi, 1977c) 
is summarised in their Table 1 (Gerber and Scheidel, 2018: 189), see also Appendix II of this 
paper, which consists of two opposing columns.  The key contrasting points of substantive vs 
formal economics are given as being: in kind vs money; in substance vs form; need vs price 
based; use vs exchange value; value incommensurability and weak comparability (biophysical 
and socioeconomic indicators, multi-criteria analysis) vs monetary commensurability 
(monetary indicators and cost-benefit analysis); social metabolism vs. marginalism; planning 
vs. market.  Substantive economics is designated to be concrete and field-driven, and they link 
this to regarding the economy as an historical construct embedded in society and the 
environment.  In contrast, formal economics is specified as being abstract and model-driven, 
and they link this to regarding the economy as being a deduced structure based on a set of 
axioms, e.g., homo economicus (Gerber and Scheidel, 2018: 189).  I will contend that these 
sets of claims confuse economics and the economy.  For example, the economy is not a 
deduction, deduction is what some economists do to make inferences, while whether an 
economy is embedded is a question about real structure in the world. 
 
That is, the way in which the argument is made mixes-up what an economy is in reality 
(ontology) with what economics needs to do to create knowledge (epistemology).  Gerber and 
Scheidel (2018: 186) argue that the history of the substantive vs. formal dichotomy in 
economic thought extends “from Aristotle to the founding fathers of modern ecological 
economics”.  This claim is problematic because it is made by assuming the formal definition 
has always been relevant to actual economies, something which would defy understanding the 
origins of modern market capitalism.  In the attempt to create an overarching support for their 
claims, they also mix in epistemological concerns that have little or nothing to do with 
whether any actual economies have substantive or formal qualities, or whether a researcher 
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decides to accept the definition of what is economic as substantive or formal or both.  They 
proceed to erroneously classify approaches in epistemology as being either substantive or 
formal and fail to notice how this results in a conflict with the designation of specific people 
(e.g., Neurath, Polanyi, Georgescu-Roegen) as being in their substantive economics camp.  In 
the following I aim to outline each of these points.  My overall concern here is to clarify how 
ecological economics should proceed as a social science and go beyond past dichotomous 
thinking. 
 
2. Economics vs. Economies 
At the outset a distinction needs to be made between economics as a discipline (a field of 
social science research) and the economy as a social reality.  The latter is the object of study 
and its form through history and how it changes is a major topic of research.  Historical 
analysis of the economy also means going beyond using theories that are relevant for actual 
systems in existence today.  This is even more important for ecological economists committed 
to SEE, because their concern is for the social ecological transformation of the current system 
to a more socially just and ecologically harmonious system. 
 
What economists of various sorts do in their practice is a different matter.  Lack of realism 
has been a criticism of certain camps within ecological economics itself, especially because of 
the adoption of mainstream approaches (Spash, 2011, 2012b, 2013).  Economics as a social 
practice may have absolutely nothing to do with understanding the actual economy or 
historical economies.  This is indeed the major contention of many heterodox economists with 
respect to mainstream macroeconomics and neoclassical economics.  Distinguishing 
economics as a discipline from the actual economy is important exactly because what is 
termed economic by the mainstream has been reified as the actual economy in almost total 
disregard of reality. 
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This problem has been recognised for some time and was termed the ‘economistic fallacy’ by 
Polanyi (1977b).  In part of his research he explored economies throughout human history 
(Dalton, 1971; Polanyi et al., 1957).  What his economistic fallacy showed was how not just 
economists but also anthropologists, historians and sociologists adopted a basically 
neoclassical economic price-making market theory and applied this to every human society 
that ever existed.  Due to the rise of neoliberalism the ‘economistic fallacy’ has become even 
more prevalent today.  All human choices are deemed to be within the remit of economics, 
because they are defined as individual cost-benefit decisions that can be made most efficiently 
by placing them within a price-making market (e.g., the work of Becker equating life and 
death decision to buying a cup of coffee, as made most explicit in his suicide economics).  
Polanyi was concerned to expose the erroneous imposition of a specific, market based, 
economic logic on all social reality. 
 
What should be clear then is that a practice in economics should not be confused with 
operations of an actual economy.  In this respect the question posed by Gerber and Scheidel 
(2018: 187) of “whether the study of the economy should be substantive or formal” is 
incorrect, and so is their claim that this has been a fundamental question running throughout 
economic and social political thought since the ancient Greeks.  The question is not some 
dichotomous choice between a priori approaches in economics, but rather what approach 
enables the best understanding of our object of study, namely a specific spatial and temporal 
economy.  Their second claim is also incorrect because ‘formal economics’, as defined in 
their Table 1 (see Appendix II), has only existed since the rise of theorising about price-
making markets.  More specifically, the marginalist revolution of the late 1800s became, what 
Veblen termed in 1900, neoclassical economics; a term that did not take-off until the 1950s 
(Aspromourgos, 1986).  Before the rise of price-making market capitalism there was no such 
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set of points that could have been deemed relevant to understanding the general operation of 
an actual economy.  This, in fact, was the contention of Polanyi and his colleagues in their 
historical analyses of past societies (see Polanyi et al., 1957).  However, Polanyi too easily 
removes the attributes of capitalism and focussed solely on markets and often fails to qualify 
his discussion with “price-making”, just as he fails to qualify exchange with market.  
Elements of price-making markets may appear and disappear and this was why Polanyi 
(1957b) could write that Aristotle discovered ‘the economy’, meaning he had noted such an 
occurrence of this type of market institution.  However, we should not confuse the occurrence 
of such markets with capitalism, which is only a few hundred years in existence and has a 
distinct social and economic form of its own (see Wood, 2003). 
 
3. Economies as Objects of Study 
The point then is to clarify what is important about economies that makes a substantive theory 
more insightful than a formalist theory?  Does one provide a better understanding than the 
other?  The relevance of and debate over substantive versus formal economics was mainly 
due to the work of Polanyi (1957a, 1977a), which impacted on economic history, 
anthropology, archaeology and sociology.  In this respect, his historical work needs to be 
separated from his ideas about the currently existing capitalist economy. 
 
Here there is a misleading classification in Gerber and Scheidel (2018: 143).  Polanyi is 
placed firmly in the substantivist camp as if he opposed formalist economics. 
“the formalists emphasized the universal claims of neoclassical economics while the 
substantivists, like Polanyi, gave priority to the empirical content of material 
circumstances and disputed that this diversity could be adequately grasped through just 
one set of concepts” (Gerber and Scheidel, 2018: 143) 
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In a literal sense this statement is correct, but what is left out is that Polanyi accepted the 
validity of neoclassical economics for understanding the current economic system.  That is, he 
thought formal economics was valid for the object of study called a price-making market 
economy.  This is why he was so positive and enthusiastic about Menger’s discovery of the 
marginalist theory,2 as evident in the quote of Polanyi by Gerber and Scheidel (2018: 144), 
regarding it as being a brilliant and formidable achievement in price theory.  Polanyi was not 
against neoclassical economics and accepted the formal definition, because he believed it was 
highly relevant as an explanation of real price-making market economies, and he made this 
very clear. 
“Neo-classical economics was established on Carl Menger's premise that its appropriate 
concern was the allocation of insufficient means to provide for man’s livelihood.  This 
was the first statement of the postulate of scarcity, or maximization.  As a succinct 
formulation of the logic of rational action with reference to the economy, it ranks high 
among the achievements of the human mind.  Its importance was enhanced by a superb 
relevance to the actual operation of market institutions which, due to their maximizing 
effects in day-to-day operations, were by their nature amenable to such an approach.” 
(Polanyi, 1971: 17-18) 
His criticism was not that formal economics was wrong, but rather that the “self-regulating 
market” economy it described would create social harm that was unacceptable and needed to 
be controlled (Gemici, 2015).  He used the theory of a self-regulating market without question 
in his major thesis The Great Transformation (Polanyi, 1944), because it was the 
consequences, not the internal operation, on which he focussed.  The downside of this is a 
                                                 
2 Polanyi credits Menger solely with this discovery.  However, Menger’s 1871 Grundsätze 
der Volkswirtschaftslehre included theories on marginal analysis, the same year that Jevons 
published them in his Theory of Political Economy.  Léon Walras also published marginalist 
theories in his Elements d’économie Politique Pure in 1874.  Together these three are 
generally taken as forming the roots of the marginal revolution that led to neoclassical 
economics. 
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failure to think critically about neoclassical economics, contradictions in his writing as to the 
role of economies in relation to society and a lack of theorising as to the social construction of 
price-making markets and capitalism (see Gemici, 2015).  Yet, from Polanyi’s work much can 
be built, but not by adopting his blind spots, which include the substantive vs formal 
dichotomy. 
 
The categorisation of Polanyi as a substantivist along with Neurath and Kapp is also 
problematic.  In terms of what a future economy might be like Polanyi was not in the 
substantivist camp.  His own specific theory was one of market (Guild) socialism; that is he 
accepted a central role for price-making markets.  This positon is made clear in his 
engagement during the 1920s in the socialist calculation debate against the Austrian 
economist von Mises (for more on the debate see Adaman and Devine, 1996).  Polanyi’s main 
contribution on the topic has not been translated into English, but is discussed by Gemici 
(2015) and Dale (2010 Chapter 1).  Gemici (2015: 140) notes that Polanyi’s approach has 
similarities to the market socialist model of Oskar Lange (1936, 1937).  Lange employed 
formalist neoclassical market models but with prices set by government administration.  
Polanyi believed a command economy without markets would not work.  He argued for an 
economic system that mixed market types with production sectors having fixed prices set by 
administration (e.g., for raw materials, wages and intermediate goods) while final goods 
sectors would have flexible prices negotiated by market actors (e.g., for consumer goods and 
end products).  Market socialism, of various forms, was a popular alternative in the 1920s and 
1930s. 
 
In contrast, Neurath, Polanyi’s contemporary, did not opt for market socialism (Uebel, 2004: 
51-52), but favoured a centrally planned economy along war time footings (Neurath, 2004 
[1910]).  This is the economy in-kind mentioned by Gerber and Scheidel (2018: 188).  The 
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much younger Kapp never outlined a comprehensive alternative in any detail, although in his 
1936 (German language) thesis he did engage in the socialist calculation debate against (his 
supervisor) von Mises (see partial translation in Berger, 2016).  In Kapp’s later work, 
concerning how to include social costs in decision processes, there are evident tensions 
between his references to opening-up for participation and writings on setting objective 
minimum standards that override subjective public opinion (Kapp, 1978). 
 
What this brief summary of positions shows is the variety amongst these authors.  This 
emphasises the need to avoid oversimplification as if Polanyi, Neurath and Kapp represent 
some common position that fits neatly under substantive economics.  Their contributions are 
interesting for research, but they should neither be simply equated nor so easily identified 
with a uniform agenda.  Their importance is in what they enable us to understand about 
debates of the past and their insights into alternatives for the future, and they should certainly 
be a serious part of our studies.  Yet, those studies need to be more than classifications into 
dichotomies and need to maintain criticality.  They need to be aware of both insights and 
mistakes made by past thinkers and aim to move beyond their errors. 
 
In this respect, the substantivist vs formalist debate was later regarded as having been rather 
fruitless, especially amongst economic anthropologists.  Firth (1972: 470) described it as 
“largely sterile”, while noting he had, since the 1930s, agreed with the logic that applying an 
economic theory concerned with markets and prices is problematic for understanding 
economic systems that have neither.  The substantivist position in economic anthropology was 
based on Polanyi’s concern that conventional economic theory is inadequate for analysing 
traditional tribal/peasant economies.  A new economic theory was deemed necessary and 
Polanyi (1957a) had developed an institutional approach for understanding markets, and more 
generally economies, as instituted processes.  However, later, the Polanyian position was seen 
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as too limiting, because it was taken to exclude all aspects of price-making market economies 
(e.g. competition, forms of market exchange) which might appear, or be implicit, in 
traditional tribal/peasant economies.  Firth (1972: 470), like other formalists, concluded that 
“a more rather than a less sophisticated knowledge of economic theory is require”, but also 
that the issue had become where, how far and with what changes economic theory could be 
applied.  That, however, left unanswered which economic theory was relevant, and also 
implicitly assumed the existing orthodox theory was a valid basis for the analysis (i.e., could 
explain actual price-making markets).  In fact, as Godelier (1977: 21) notes, arguments like 
those of Firth meant that, formalist and substantivist positons came together due to “the 
modification, the flexibility, even the surrender, of formalist theses by their own defenders”.  
The formalist theory was so inadequate it had to be changed beyond recognition. 
 
The basic history of the anthropological debate over the substantive vs formalist approaches 
and definitions is that economies exist in various forms, they are not singular entities, and the 
forms vary in how they use different institutions (i.e., conventions, norms, rules and 
regulations).  There is variety in the occurrence of the institutions of competition, markets, 
trade, money and prices.  Anthropologists, like Marshall Sahlins and Maurice Godelier 
rejected any formal definition of economics, but considered the substantive definition 
inadequate because it excludes too many concepts simply because they are associated solely 
with formalist market economies.  They moved to a synthesis, borrowing concepts from 
Marx, that focuses on the combination of productive forces and specific social relations of 
production and seeks to explain the reproduction of economic arrangements.  Economies are 
understood as consisting of the structure and form of the process of production and the 
circulation of material goods.  Different historical modes of production (e.g., slave, feudal, 
capitalist) are identifiable as general categories.  However, a specific society may also be 
organised on the basis of several interconnected modes of production, where one dominates 
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(Godelier, 1977: 18).  So, the basic outcome of the formalist vs. substantivist debate in 
economic anthropology was to side with the substantivist in recognising the need for 
institutional analysis of society, but broaden the institutional arrangements to include aspects 
of formalist conceptualisation of price-making markets, while going beyond the empiricism of 
both to seek analysis of structural causal mechanisms.3  As Godelier (1977: 62) puts it: 
“Only a theory and method which enables us to think and analyse the form, function, 
the hierarchy and the articulation, the conditions for the appearance and transformation 
of social relations can hope to take over in a radical way from the impotence of 
functionalism and structuralism, putting an end to the state of helpless vacillation 
existing in the human sciences.” 
 
4. False Dichotomising and Confused Epistemology 
Gerber and Scheidel (2018) employ the substantive vs. formal distinction in combination with 
some rather broad brush merging of epistemology into their argument.  This occurs in their 
attempt to create support for an overarching substantive vs formal division throughout the 
history of economic thought.  Three specific instances of such imposition of the dichotomy 
occur in the article.  First is with respect to the Methodenstreit, a debate over methods of 
inference in late 1800s.  Second is with respect to Georgescu-Roegen’s attack on economic 
‘methodology’.  Third is the dichotomy drawn between abstract and concrete.  The point to be 
made here is that none of these issues in epistemology is best understood by reframing them 
as aspects of an imagined substantivist vs formalist debate. 
 
                                                 
3 The recognition of the limited insight into reality possible from empirical research means 
going beyond observation and data to seek the causal mechanism and structure that explain 
events.  This is a position that is totally in line with a critical realist approach to ecological 
economics (for an introduction see Puller and Smith, 2017), and specifically its depth 
ontology (see Collier, 1994 Chapter 2). 
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The Methodenstreit was a debate in epistemology between deductivists and inductivists that 
started from a dispute between Menger and Schmoller (Sandelin et al., 2008: 71).  As one of 
the founders of the then new marginalist theory, Menger was engaged on the side of 
deductivism and seeking laws.  The opponents, led initially by Schmoller, were members of 
the German historical school who argued for using historical data to seek recurrent 
regularities.  In order to claim that this debate has anything to do with divisions of economic 
into substantive vs formal would mean equating induction/inductivists with the substantive, 
and deduction/deductivists with the formal.  Besides the absence of any reason for such 
division, the key people involved violate its conditions. 
 
According to Polanyi (1977c), Menger is the key inspiration for his formal vs substantive 
definition of economic.  Polanyi (1971: 18) references Menger as defining these “two basic 
directions of the human economy”.  Polanyi (1977c: 23) quotes Menger as stating that in “the 
actual economy” these two directions occur as a rule together and indeed are almost never 
found separately, despite then claiming this could be a possible regular occurrence in some 
types of economy.  How such a regular occurrence could be possible is hard to imagine.  The 
reason being that, while an economy without economizing activity (the formal definition of 
‘economic’) is possible, no economy, nor any human society, can exist without the physical 
requirements for sufficiency!  This emphasises the universal importance of the material 
aspects of social provisioning and what Polanyi termed the substantive definition of 
economic.  In any case, Menger accepted the presence of both the substantive and formal in 
actual economies “as a rule”.  Yet in the Methodenstreit Menger was arguing for deductivism.  
So being a deductivist has no necessary connection with accepting or rejecting actual 
economies as having a substantive element, nor does it prevent an economist from accepting 
the relevance of the substantive definition of economic. 
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The Methodenstreit cannot therefore be taken as having anything to do with the substantive 
vs. formal definition of economic.  Indeed, in contrast to this debate, epistemological 
pluralism would argue that there is nothing inherently bad about making inferences by 
deduction as opposed to induction.  They each have their benefits and drawbacks.  Thus, in 
his economic textbook, where he later appraised the Methodenstreit debate, Neurath saw the 
whole matter as a pseudo-problem, and like others combined the historical and theoretical 
approaches (Uebel, 2004: 29).  Gerber and Scheidel (2018: 188) place Neurath in the 
substantivist camp on the basis of his advocacy of multiple indicators in economic planning.  
However, on the basis of their epistemological division (induction=substantive vs. 
deduction=formal) he does not fit, but then again this epistemological dichotomy does not 
have much validity in any case. 
 
This is not to say deduction as being used today in economics is unproblematic.  On the 
contrary, what is wrong with modern economic use of ‘formal’ mathematical deduction is that 
it is applied regardless of its relevance and has become a prescriptive approach to economics.  
That is, being an economist is defined by the current mainstream as doing mathematical 
deduction.  In modern times Lawson has extensively and repeatedly criticised the deductivism 
of orthodox economics, but he also does not reject deductivism as a totally invalid approach 
for making inferences (for example see Lawson, 2009). 
 
Another claim Gerber and Scheidel (2018: 188) make is that the use of quantification is a 
designation of being signed-up to the definition of economic as formal, which is clear when 
they state, using Georgescu-Roegen’s terminology, “arithmomorphism (i.e. formal 
approaches)”.  Inappropriate use of mathematics, not its total banishment, was the concern of 
Georgescu-Roegen and he cannot be classified simply as a supporter of defining economics as 
substantive just because he questioned economic ‘mathematical formalism’.  The point of 
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Georgescu-Roegen’s argument is much broader than ‘formal economics’ as defined by Gerber 
and Scheidel (2018: 189).  Indeed his critique of quantification is general and would apply 
equally to in-kind quantification as to monetary quantification.  His concern is about what 
quantification can and cannot achieve.  The conversion of his argument, by Gerber and 
Scheidel (2018: 188), into a dichotomy between “arithmomorphic (i.e. clear and quantifiable) 
and dialectical” is particularly strange because the dialectic is about going beyond 
dichotomies!  He actually uses a rather specific definition of dialectical concepts as those that 
violate the Principle of Contradiction; namely that they are instances in which B is both A and 
non-A (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971: 46).  For example grey is both black and non-black, white 
and non-white.  The usefulness of this dialectic is in legitimising concepts that are in this 
sense fuzzy, not distinctly definable and certainly not mathematically so.  Although, even here 
he allows that: “arithmomorphic models are definitely useful as simile of dialectical reasoning 
to facilitate communication and to detect possible logical errors” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1981: 
190). 
 
In his paper on the topic entitled ‘Methods in Economic Science’ (Georgescu-Roegen, 1979) 
the concern for a dialectical approach is in the context of the ‘mathematisation’ of economics.  
He accepted the validity of the mathematical method of economics, but held that it was 
restricted to a small field that he termed engineering economics.  Georgescu-Roegen does 
exactly what I argued above is necessary for good science; that is, he criticises the approach 
on the basis of what it is able to tell about the object of study.  His core argument is about 
epistemology, what we can know.  We cannot know everything by using numbers because not 
everything has the form (morph) of a number (arithmetic).  Qualitative information is 
therefore essential as well.  His point is made clear in the following quote: 
“modern economics has ignored even the most fundamental qualitative aspects of the 
economic process.  Why have standard economists failed, for example, to perceive the 
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essential difference between “fund” and “flow”, a failure responsible for several 
important fallacies mentioned in my article” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1981: 190-191) 
However, there is then no a priori dichotomy, or choice to be made, between formal 
(quantification) and substantive (dialectic) as suggested by Gerber and Scheidel (2018: 188).  
Indeed, Georgescu-Roegen was at some pains to defend himself from simplistic classification 
as being against ‘mathematical formalism’ as an epistemology.  As he stated: 
“[…] in order to prevent (as much as may be possible) misinterpretations of my 
position.  I would be among the last servants of science to deny the indispensable role of 
theory, which must necessarily aspire to be quantitative and hence mathematical, 
provided “theory” is not separated completely from fact. […] I would also be among the 
first to defend the absolute necessity of historical and institutional studies in social 
sciences, hence in economics.” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1976: xi) 
We might disagree with his positon on the necessity of mathematics, but that does not change 
what he stated so clearly.  Like Menger, Neurath and Polanyi, he is neither in the substantive 
nor the formal camps that Gerber and Scheidel try to create on epistemological grounds. 
 
In another area of epistemology, Gerber and Scheidel (2018: 189) conflate formal with 
abstract and create a dichotomy between abstract and concrete.  All research requires concepts 
and all concepts are abstractions.  Similarly, as noted by Georgescu-Roegen above, theory is 
indispensable.  Observation is theory laden and cannot be divorced from our conceptual 
models of the world.  Thus, the common misperception that there is some dichotomy between 
theory and observation needs to be dispelled (for a clear exposition on this point see Sayer, 
1992).  The extent to which Gerber and Scheidel fall into this trap is unclear.  However, they 
use the term concrete and appear to link this to empirical, while their Table 1 (see Appendix 
II) contrasts it with an approach that is abstract, model-driven and deductive (Gerber and 
Scheidel, 2018: 189).  Concrete is introduced with reference to Marx (Gerber and Scheidel, 
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2018: 187), but the authors give no definition in their paper.  In the Grundrisse 1857, Marx 
states: “The concrete concept is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus 
representing the unity of diverse aspects.” (cited in Sayer, 1981: 7).  On the basis of Marx’ 
definition, the concrete is about specifying multiple aspects of an object of study and not 
equivalent to the empirical because it may involve the non-observable and metaphysical.  
Marx is noted to have used ‘abstract’ in a derogatory way but there is nothing inherently bad 
about abstraction.  As Sayer (1981: 7) notes, the requirement is for a “general epistemological 
distinction for discerning misleading abstraction from enlightening or rational abstraction: the 
abstract-concrete distinction is not enough on its own”.  Sayer goes on to offer means for 
doing so. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The aim of advocating substantive economics—that ecological economics seek to become 
“largely about the ‘substantive’ (in ‘kind’) study of the economy” (Gerber and Scheidel, 
2018: 186)—appears to be a well meaning redirection away from the excesses of new 
environmental pragmatism and new resource economics (Spash, 2013).  Neoclassical 
economics is by definition not heterodox and the desire of Gerber and Scheidel is clearly for a 
non-orthodox approach to economics.  There are good grounds within SEE on which to base 
the rejection of mainstream economics and to create an alternative.  However, the core 
requirement is to address real economies, both past and present, in order to understand how 
we can transform to a different future. 
 
The reason why a substantive economics cannot be the main foundation for ecological 
economics is that it is created from a false dichotomy.  Menger was wrong to imply the ability 
to divorce social provisioning from the actual economy; all economies have this substantive 
element.  Polanyi was wrong to create a hard-line between the past non-market (substantive) 
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and present market (formal) economies, and it is also unnecessary for his core critical 
arguments.  However, in this Polanyi followed a common 19th Century position that 
contrasted ancient with modern societies based on the former being built around status, 
instinct, feeling and custom, while the latter involved contract and rational decision-making.  
In particular, Polanyi’s theory—the extension of price-making markets to new areas of social 
life—borrows heavily from Tönnies 1887 theory of historical evolution (Gemici, 2008).  
Tönnies argued that human history had consisted of living in mostly natural relations of 
community (Gemeinschaft), but the rise of capitalism had led to, what he termed, a “great 
transformation” into an artificial society increasingly based on contract (Gesellschaft).  
Although he held that social entities contain elements of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft the 
change was domination of the latter over the former (Gemici, 2008: 23).  Tönnies believed 
this transformation was irreversible and tragic, but that a new communal age might arise 
(Dale, 2011: 310).  As Gemici (2008: 23) notes, Polanyi develops Tönnies’ theory into a 
general proposition about the changing place of economy in society, but in so doing adopts 
dichotomies that do not hold (e.g., contract vs. status, divorcing contract from its social and 
institutional elements). 
 
The attempt to legitimise the Polanyian dichotomy creates further false dichotomies and does 
not progress our understanding of the existing price-making market economy as emergent 
from society.  If anything the dichotomy divides us off from achieving that understanding, as 
it did Polanyi’s work, which then suffers from an inability to address the social foundations of 
the price-making market and capital accumulating economy.  That is not to denigrate what 
Polanyi achieved or the insights he gave by emphasising the importance of non-market 
institutional arrangements, but rather to say we can also recognise what else needs to be done 
some half century after the debate on this topic subsided in economic anthropology.  What 
we, ecological economists, should take from the ‘substantive economic’ definition is the 
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insight it provides into the richness and variety of human economies in the absence of price-
making markets.  What we should avoid is re-establishing and universally imposing a false 
dichotomy that prevents us from understanding where our current economic system came 
from, how it operates and how it can be changed.  Unfortunately, the dichotomy merely 
pushed the social aspect of market capitalism off the agenda, not least because the Polanyian 
formal definition accepted the marginalist model of self-regulating price-making markets 
(Gemici, 2015).  Polanyi then legitimised the approach of neoclassical economics as relevant 
to the present system as much as he exposed its inapplicability in historical contexts. 
 
In contrast, social ecological economics requires that the ecological and social emergence of 
economies be taken seriously as relevant to all economies not just historical ones.  That is, the 
ecological and social dependency of the current economy needs to be placed at the forefront 
of our understanding.  The proposal by Gerber and Scheidel (2018) to almost exclusively, or 
primarily, study substantive economics seems to imply ignoring key aspects of the current 
economy.  If this results in rejecting such things as price-making markets and monetary 
valuation as valid objects of study then it makes no sense.  If our research reveals such things 
as being bad institutions then it will also inform us as to the direction for change and social 
ecological transformation of the economy.  The issue for research is to investigate the social 
and ecological aspects of the current market economy and capitalism, just as any other 
economy. 
 
A formalist economics can never understand the current economic systems because it is setup 
to accept the validity of the neoclassical model of the marginalist school.  The irrelevance of 
formalism is its failure to recognise that trade and exchange in the market place is always and 
in every instance a social relationship involving actors and power relationships as well as 
social structures and institutional arrangements.  The strong elements in the substantive 
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approach can and should be taken forward (e.g., the economy as an institutional process, 
social provisioning outside of market structures, material and energy flows as the basis of 
provisioning).  A substantivist approach focussed on pre-capitalist economies has proven 
insightful for social and economic anthropologists, economic historians and archaeologists.  
However, therein lies the failure of adopting a substantive economics as defining ecological 
economics, it will not help us address our current system anymore than the formalist 
definition of economic helps understand the past (or indeed the present). 
 
Adopting an approach built on a dichotomy that completely removes research on the 
functioning of price-making markets and capitalism defeats achieving social ecological 
transformation.  As Sun-tzu (2003: 19), the 6th century B.C. strategist, advises: “Know the 
enemy, know yourself, and victory is never in doubt, not in a hundred battles.  He[/She] who 
knows self but not the enemy will suffer one defeat for every victory.  He[/She] who knows 
neither self nor enemy will fail in every battle.”  We need to go beyond false dichotomies and 
that includes a way to SEE beyond substantive economics. 
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Appendix I 
 
Below is the relevant text from Gerber and Scheidel (2018). 
 
Text from the Introduction 
 
We argue that ecological economics is largely about the substantive study of economic processes (“in 
substance”, “in the concrete”) as opposed to the formal approach of neoclassical economics (“in 
prices”, “in the abstract”). We suggest that ecological economics should assume more consciously the 
radical implications of the distinction between these two meanings of economics. But what does it 
imply for ecological economics to be “substantive”? How can it offer a comprehensive “substantive” 
analysis of the economy? What existing methodological tools are already available, and what can they 
offer for the study of “substantive economics”?  
 
This article tracks these questions by first outlining some landmarks in the history of the substantive 
vs. formal dichotomy in economic thought – from Aristotle to the founding fathers of modern ecological 
economics. We argue that ecological economics as substantive economics can be grounded within a 
long tradition of debates in economics. We then present a brief overview of the main existing 
approaches to the study of the metabolism of social systems, a set of approaches that we consider 
essential for the substantive analysis of economic processes, and arguably ecological economics' 
most significant contribution towards substantive economics. 
 
Text from Section 2 on Milestones in the History of the Substantive vs. Formal Dichotomy 
 
Whether the study of the economy should be substantive or formal is a fundamental question which 
runs throughout the history of economic and sociopolitical thought under different names and foci. The 
debate started perhaps with Aristotle's famous distinction between oikonomia, the wise management 
of the “household” or community, and chrematistike, the art of making money (Aristotle, 1984 [4th-c. 
BCE]). For him, whereas oikonomia seeks to address basic needs and the maintenance of the 
community over time, chrematistics is unnatural and a by-product of personal inclinations and 
institutions. He added that chrematistics is potentially dangerous because it does not lead to social 
benefits and real happiness. It goes without saying that ecological economics as substantive 
economics reclaims the original meaning of the term “economics”. 
 
Substantive economic theory could be traced back at least to Physiocracy (the “Government of 
Nature”) in the 18th century. This school reacted against mercantilism which was deemed mistakenly 
focused on monetary wealth, accumulation of gold, and the balance of trade (Meek, 1962). In contrast, 
the Physiocrats argued that the wealth of nations derived from agriculture, from a Natural order that 
humans had to understand in order to live in harmony with it.4 This is remarkable, as most of the 
subsequent schools of economics have focused on trade and markets. It is also interesting to note that 
François Quesnay – the leading figure of the Physiocrats – was a medical doctor who wanted to apply 
the scientific principles of medicine to the study of the economy, seen as comparable to a human 
body. 
 
As we will see, Karl Marx also resorted to the physiological analogy, but it is here his influential 
dichotomy between exchange and use values (and abstract vs. concrete labour) that will retain our 
attention (Marx, 1981 [1857]). Exchange value is the monetary aspect of value and constitutes the 
bedrock of a commodity's price. Use value, in contrast, is the concrete way in which a thing meets 
human needs. Marx thought that supply and demand in terms of exchange values could not form the 
basis of socialism. Exchange values respond to purchasing power but not to everyone's real needs. 
He thus envisaged the disappearance of exchange values in a mature socialist system, but never 
specified how such a substantive non-market economy might be organized. 
 
The conceptual opposition between “substance” and “form” was commonplace in 19th century's 
European philosophy and social thought. “In fact,” writes Berger (2008: 382) “since the 
substantiveformal distinction runs like a thread through the works of several European economists 
[…], it may be considered a distinct European contribution to institutionalism”, that is, to institutional 
economics. Between the 1880s and the 1890s, a foundational debate took place in the German-
speaking world, the “battle over methods” (Methodenstreit), opposing the historical economists of 
Berlin vs. the marginalists of Vienna. At stake was the pretension of the latter to offer a universal 
theoretical foundation for the study of the economy. The “substantive” historical school (albeit without 
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using the terms) argued that “formal” market mechanisms and methodological individualism could not 
explain all economic phenomena and insisted on contextualizing economic life. The Methodenstreit 
resurfaced later under different forms, as we will see. 
 
Introducing the terms in economics, Max Weber (1964 [1920]) distinguished between “formal” and 
“substantive rationality”. For him, the former refers to the degree in which activities can be calculated 
in monetary terms while the latter refers to the degree in which needs are met through economic 
activity.5 
 
Around the same time, Carl Menger – one of the three fathers of marginalism – proposed a related 
distinction between “formal” and “substantive” approaches to the economy. He wrote in his 
posthumous and untranslated second edition of the Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Menger, 
1923: 22): “the economy has two ‘elemental directions’, one of which is the [formal, maximizing] 
economizing direction […] while the other is the [substantive, physical] ‘techno-economic’ direction”. 
Karl Polanyi – influenced by Menger's distinction – noted that after the rise of marginalism and 
“because of the brilliant and formidable achievements of price theory opened up by Menger, the new 
economizing or formal meaning of economic[s] became the meaning” while the “meaning of materiality 
[…] lost academic status and was eventually forgotten” (Polanyi, 1971: 24, his emphasis). Needless to 
say, it is this second meaning which, later on, gave rise to ecological economics as a heterodox school 
of thought studying the socio-biophysical structure of the economy. In fact, the distinction became one 
of the key ideas of heterodox economics at large. 
 
After World War II, the formalist vs. substantivist debate prominently took place in economic 
anthropology. Just like during the Methodenstreit, the formalists emphasized the universal claims of 
neoclassical economics while the substantivists, like Polanyi, gave priority to the empirical content of 
material circumstances and disputed that this diversity could be adequately grasped through just one 
set of concepts (Polanyi, 1957). 
 
K. William Kapp's – arguably the first modern ecological economist – built on Weber and Polanyi and 
developed a critique of market valuation that he opposed to substantive economic planning (Gerber, 
2016). For him, societal needs cannot find “value-expression” in the formal economy based on market 
prices; they can only be expressed in the substantive economy of human livelihood and social 
reproduction in interaction with culture and nature. He thus came to the conclusion that a democratic 
and substantive planning of the economy – either partial or wide-ranging – was the best candidate for 
overcoming the incapacity of markets to meet basic human needs for all. 
 
This idea is related to the Naturalrechnung (accounting “in kind”) of Otto Neurath who also endorsed, 
like Kapp, Marx's observation that not exchange value but use value is the source of real wealth and 
thus quality of life. In the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s, another avatar of the substantive 
vs. formal debate in economics, Neurath defended the substantivist proposition that a socialist 
economy should not rely on any single unit of account – be it money, calories or labour hours – but on 
multiple indicators, including biophysical ones (O'Neill 
and Uebel, 2015). 
 
Another variant of the formal vs. substantive distinction can be found in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's 
(1971) two types of concepts: arithmomorphic (i.e. clear and quantifiable) and dialectical ones (i.e. less 
clearly delimited, not easily quantifiable, but nonetheless essential). Dialectical concepts have a core 
of meaning, but also a “penumbra” around them where their meaning may change, as in the concept 
of “needs” or “sustainability” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971: 45). He argued that most of the concepts with 
which economists work are in fact dialectical, hence the necessity to be extremely careful with formal, 
abstract approaches to the economy.6 
 
There are many instances in economics where arithmomorphism (i.e. formal approaches) 
problematically dominates research and policies, as in the monetary quantification of environmental 
values or in the asserted substitutability of forms of “capitals” (strong vs. weak sustainability debate, 
see Daly, 1990). At the opposite of such abstractions, socio-metabolic studies intend to offer a 
concrete, material way of analysing the economy. We argue that they are among the key 
comprehensive tools at our disposal for pursuing a substantive study of the economy. But before 
briefly reviewing in the next section the current main approaches to the study of a society's 
metabolism, Table 1 recapitulates what is meant by substantive and formal approaches to the 
economy. 
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Source: Gerber and Scheidel (2018) 
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